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I can only offer  two  footnotes  to John Garvey  and  Amy Coney's
splendid discussion of the obligation, if any, of Catholic judges to recuse
themselves in death penalty cases.1  Much of their article describes the
Catholic position on the death penalty, the nature  and scope of an or-
thodox Catholic's obligation to act in compliance with that position, and
the distinction  drawn in Catholic moral  teaching between  formal and
material  cooperation  with  evil.  I am  an  outsider  to the  tradition  in
which these discussions  have taken place, but my first footnote is that,
as I understand that tradition, Garvey and Coney appear to have omit-
ted discussion of a consideration that seems relevant  to the analysis of
whether an  orthodox  Catholic judge materially  cooperates  in the  ad-
ministration of the death penalty.  That  consideration  is the dilemma
that the very possibility of recusal poses.
The dilemma may arise in several settings, but here I deal with it in
its simplest forms.  Consider first the judge (I omit in what follows  the
obvious  modifier,  "orthodox  Catholic")  who  would  preside  over  the
guilt phase in a case in which the prosecutor has filed a notice of inten-
tion to seek the death penalty.  Garvey and Coney argue that this judge
need not recuse himself or herself because merely presiding at the guilt
phase is material cooperation that, on balance, is insufficient to support
the conclusion that the judge has acted  immorally.  Suppose, however,
that the judge believes that death penalty  cases  are characterized by a
higher rate of trial error in the guilt phase than non-capital cases.  Sup-
pose that this belief is based on the notion that the pressures on prose-
cutors  to obtain  convictions  that will  support death  sentences  induce
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overreaching and the notion that the pressures on defense attorneys in-
duce  a kind of fatalistic paralysis  that leads  them to  sloppy behavior.2
Further,  suppose  the  judge  believes  that  appellate  courts  scrutinize
claimed errors in the guilt phase  of capital cases  more  closely, on the
ground, perhaps unconsciously held, that "death is different. 3  The trial
judge is of course conscientious, and will conduct any trial in a way that
makes  it as  error-free  as  possible.  If  the judge's  scrupulous  actions
during the trial's guilt phase produce a record free of error and the jury
convicts, the judge will have increased the probability that a death sen-
tence, if imposed at the penalty phase, will be carried out.'  As I under-
stand  Garvey and Coney's  description  of Catholic moral teaching,  ac-
tions that increase  the probability of evil  actually  occurring  constitute
material  cooperation with evil.  The judge who  presides over the guilt
phase of a capital trial therefore provides material cooperation through
his or her efforts to make the trial as error-free  as possible.
Recusal, however, does not eliminate the problem of material coop-
eration, although it may attenuate it."  Suppose  the judge believes  that
the "substitute" judge-the one who will be called on to preside if the
judge  recuses himself or herself-is likely to allow more errors during
the trial.'  In itself, this would decrease the probability that a death sen-
tence, if imposed,  would  be carried out.  Unfortunately,  a  simple  in-
crease in trial errors may have  two offsetting  effects:  The errors may
2.  Indeed, the judge might believe that this ineradicable  error rate is  an important fea-
ture of death penalty cases supporting the conclusion  that the death penalty  is unconstitu-
tional as well as immoral.
3.  To me that conclusion seems  well-supported by the Supreme Court's decisions about
criminal procedure-trial error-during the 1950s and 1960s.
4.  I simply note the possibility that a prosecutor, concerned that this judge will be over-
scrupulous because  of the judge's agreement  with Catholic doctrine, might seek to remove
the judge.  Garvey  and  Coney  do  not  analyze  whether  a judge-specific  motion  to  recuse
should be granted, devoting their attention instead to the question of whether the judge's re-
ligion alone supports such a motion.
5.  As  I  understand  the  relevant  moral  teaching,  the  attenuation  occurs  because  the
judge's actions in recusing are even more remote from the evil than participating in the trial's
guilt phase.  See James F. Keenan,  S.J., Cooperation,  Principle  of,  in NEW  DICTIONARY  OF
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 232,234 (Judith A. Dwyer ed., 1994).
6.  If the substitute judge is likely to make fewer errors, recusal increases the probability
that a death sentence, if imposed, will be carried out, over such probability  if the judge him-
self or herself presides.  To me, the analysis seems  to me  the same,  although  the degree of
material cooperation is  of course smaller.  (I should note that my unfamiliarity with Catholic
moral  teaching  makes me  uncomfortable in  suggesting that material cooperation  comes in
sizes  like "large"  and  "small.")  To the extent  that Catholic moral teaching  requires some
sort of on-balance judgment, however, some metaphor implicating size  or weight seems in-
evitable.  According to Keenan, supra note 4, at some points in the moral analysis, "a consid-
erable weighing of values occurs" (emphasis added).
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increase the probability of reversal if a conviction  is obtained, but they
may also increase the probability that a conviction  will be obtained.  If
the probability of conviction increases enough relative to the increase in
the probability  of reversal,  the judge  who  recuses may make  it more
likely that the death penalty will be carried out.  Both recusing and pre-
siding, then, appear to constitute material cooperation with evil.7
Similarly,  if, as  Garvey  and  Coney  argue,  sitting  as  an  appellate
judge constitutes material, but not formal, cooperation with evil, recus-
ing oneself from an appellate panel may do so as well, by increasing the
probability that a death sentence will be affirmed.  This is so because, as
they hint in their brief comment that judges can "find reasons to reverse
even in easy cases," s all judges have some interpretive or discretionary
space  when  dealing  with  claims  of procedural  unconstitutionality  in
connection with a death penalty trial or capital sentencing hearing, re-
gardless  of the constitutional status of the death penalty.9  A conscien-
tious judge might think that he or she will be more alert than any substi-
tute judge to these problems precisely  because of the judge's views  on
the death penalty.' 0  Recusing will once  again make it more likely that
the conviction and death sentence will be affirmed."
My second footnote  expands  on Garvey and Coney's  discussion of
whether  a motion  to recuse  a judge  based  solely  on the fact that the
judge is Catholic  should be granted.  I have no quarrel with their con-
clusion that it should not.  Garvey  and Coney  say that the inference
from religious affiliation to actual belief is far too weak to make mem-
bership alone something that a reasonable person would think gave rise
7.  Although of course a lot will depend on circumstances.
8.  Garvey & Coney, supra note 1, at 342.
9.  Garvey  and  Coney  overstate  the  suggestion  when  they  characterize  a judge  who
searches  deeply for reversible error as a judge engaging in "cheating."  Id. at 343.  A better
word, which they use as well, is "nit-picking."  Id.  at 343.  But, after all, nit-picking is ineffec-
tive unless there are nits to pick.  Given interpretive flexibility, an ever-present characteristic
of any complex legal system is that judges ordinarily can fairly find reversible error, particu-
larly if they think it is proper to invoke a "death is different" standard.
10.  In this setting,  Garvey and Coney's analysis produces  an odd structure of hope for
litigants:  Defendants would  like judges who are persuaded by Garvey and Coney's analysis
to refrain from acting on it, so that they would have a sympathetic judge hear their case and
thereby increase their probability of avoiding the death penalty.  Prosecutors  would like such
judges  to recuse themselves, thereby increasing the probability that a death sentence  will be
carried out, producing a result contrary to the moral teachings that motivate the judge's deci-
sion to recuse.
11.  I genuinely wonder about the possibility that a judge can insulate himself or herself
from moral criticism even further by participating in the decision  up to the point when  the
judge's colleagues outvote him or her.
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to an appearance of partiality.  But suppose we switch from a setting in
which  all we know about  a judge is his or her religious  affiliation.  In-
stead of thinking of a judge faced  with a motion to recuse, consider  a
nominee  for  a  judicial  position.  Assume  that  Garvey  and  Coney's
analysis becomes widely known, and a substantial number of Catholics
begin to think that their co-religionists who are judges should ordinarily
refuse to preside over the penalty phase in capital cases.  A Catholic is
nominated  for  a position  as  a  federal  district  judge.  May  a  senator
properly ask the nominee, "Do you agree with Garvey and Coney's po-
sition about your religious obligations, and if so, do you intend to recuse
yourself from presiding over the penalty phase in capital cases?"
There is a view of the proper scope of senatorial inquiry that would
rule such  a question  out on the  ground  that senators  should  examine
only  the nominee's  general  legal  ability  and character, not his or  her
specific views on any particular matter.1 2  I believe, to the contrary, that
a senator can properly ask a wide range of questions seeking informa-
tion that will support a predictive judgment about the nominee's likely
behavior,  including how the nominee  will rule on controversial  issues.
Suppose a broad inquiry, though perhaps not as broad as that, is proper.
Is the inquiry into the nominee's position on recusal in light of Garvey
and  Coney's  argument  and  the  nominee's  religion  nonetheless  im-
proper?
I  doubt  that  either  of  the  arguments  Garvey  and  Coney  make
against a determination that a Catholic judge may not preside in a death
penalty  case  without  giving  the  appearance  of partiality  bars  the in-
quiry.  The senator is not seeking to draw an inference from the nomi-
nee's religious beliefs alone; the senator is not asserting that something
follows "simply by virtue of [the nominee's] membership in the Catholic
Church."13  Rather, the senator is  asking about the behavioral implica-
tions of holding  a belief-a belief that the senator  does  not know the
nominee holds until the question is answered.'
But what is the behavior in which the senator is interested?  It is not
that the nominee might subordinate  his or her legal judgment to his or
her religious beliefs, because the behavior at issue, recusal, is authorized
by law.  The senator, then, seems to be asking whether the nominee will
12.  See,  e.g.,  Bruce E. Fein, A  Circumscribed  Senate Confirmation  Role, 102  HARV. L.
REv. 672 (1989).
13.  Garvey & Coney, supra note 1, at 347.
14.  For the same reason, it does not seem to me that the senator is moving in the direc-
tion of imposing a religious test.
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pursue a lawful course of conduct  once in office.'5  And, even for one
who holds the view that senators  may ask a lot of questions,  it is not
clear  to me exactly why finding out that a nominee will recuse himself
or herself is at all relevant to the confirmation issue. 16
I conclude with a point that should  be  obvious.  Nowhere  in  the
course of their paper do Garvey and Coney identify a single judge who
has recused himself or herself from the capital punishment  process be-
cause  of the judge's adherence  to  Catholic  doctrine.  Perhaps judges
disagree  with their  analysis  of the  orthodox  Catholic  judge's  obliga-
tion.7  I think it more likely, however, that judges simply have not given
the topic much thought.  If some judges  come to have second thoughts
about their participation in death penalty cases, Garvey and Coney will
have performed an invaluable service.
15.  One might analogize this situation to the law of accommodation  of religious beliefs
under federal employment discrimination  law:  it is difficult to see why anyone needs to know
whether a religious believer will seek an accommodation  authorized  by law, and it is easy to
see why we might be nervous about allowing pre-employment inquiries about the applicant's
intentions.
16.  Were  such a question  to be  asked,  it might be  based  on the  senator's  view  that
someone who agrees with Garvey's and Coney's analysis of the recusal question might rule in
a particular way on the merits of issues presented in other cases.  Such a senator would then
be inferring a position on substantive questions from religious belief and would be subject to
Garvey and Coney's two-fold criticism.
17.  It seems to me that judges should not rely on reasons akin to those offered by Gov-
ernor  Cuomo for his position on abortion.  Governor Cuomo argued that, to promote social
harmony and leave open the possibility that moral teachings now associated specifically with
the Catholic Church would become much more widely held in the long run, Catholic public
officials should not use  their offices to advance those of the Church's  moral teachings that
are now highly contentious  in the society.  Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public  Mo-
rality: A  Catholic Governor's Perspective, 1 NOTRE  DAME J.L. ETHICS  & PUB.  POL'Y 13
(1984).  But a judge who recuses himself or herself does not seem to be "using"  the office of
judge to advance a contentious moral position.
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